Why are troops stationed in japan

The Navy and Air Force are better able to provide the high-performance fighter aircraft, bombers, submarines, and surface warfare ships needed for the blue-water engagements that such scenarios involving China would likely entail.

Okinawa is a convenient base from which to conduct routine Marine patrols in the Western Pacific. Such patrols, typically involving about 2, troops on three to five ships and conducted by so-called Marine Expeditionary Units, are maintained by Okinawan-based Marines.

But other Marines begin and end routine overseas patrols from the continental United States, and the Marines now in Okinawa could too. At worst, if all Marine units were based in the United States, there might be longer gaps between successive patrols overseas.

The usual six-month rotations at sea would include a month in trans-Pacific voyages in addition to the five months on station, making a decline in efficiency of about 15 percent.

But the Navy and Marine Corps have already learned how to deal with gaps between successive deployments. They cover for each other, send different types of ships such as destroyers for routine presence missions, or get temporary help from the Army or Air Force if land basing is available in a given theater as it often is for occasional deployments, even when other countries do not want a permanent U.

They could do so even more. Moreover, if one wishes to focus on military efficiency, there is much to be said against keeping forces on Okinawa. Technically, Marines are not stationed there, they are temporarily deployed.

Thus, to keep 20, Marines on Okinawa, perhaps twice that number must be kept in the active-duty force structure—a luxury we may no longer want to afford. In the event that it brought forces home from Okinawa, the Marine Corps would have other options as well. It might, for example, maintain a continuous presence in the Pacific by placing less priority on its standard patrol in the Mediterranean, where the United States enjoys strong allies and a much improved geopolitical backdrop thanks to developments in the Middle East and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Thus, Army special forces or light infantry units might take over this traditional Marine responsibility in the Mediterranean and allow sea-based forces to focus more attention on those regions where reliable land bases are not so plentiful. As another option, the Marine Corps could borrow an idea from William Morgan, of the Center for Naval Analyses, and rotate crews by flying them from the United States to meet ships overseas.

Doing so would obviate the need for long ocean voyages to and from the United States except when major ship repairs were needed. Indeed, Okinawa might be a rendezvous point where crews began and ended their shifts.

But those dollars would be spent in the United States, stimulating the economy and mitigating the pain of the ongoing military base closure process. Moreover, as suggested above, moving the Marines home might make it possible to reduce the overall size of the Corps if U. In that event, there could even be net savings associated with the move. Moving the American Marines away from Okinawa, either to Hawaii or to the continental United States, would go far to defuse the current discontent in Okinawa and dramatically reduce the likelihood that it would recur there or elsewhere in Japan in the future.

Any perception abroad that the United States was disengaging from Asia would be countered not only by continued Marine patrols in the Western Pacific, but by the enduring presence of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel in Japan and Korea.

Japan would retain an important, yet less politically taxing, role in the U. Marine presence in the Pacific. If the Marine pullout from Okinawa alarms any of Americas friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific, Washington should explore with them yet another possibility— deploying some Marine units to places like Darwin, Australia, and Pusan, Korea. Both, like Okinawa, are close to strategically important areas in Northeast and Southeast Asia see table 2.

It is even possible that some Japanese may grow anxious at the prospect of the departure of U. Nine experts consulted by GAO researchers said that the U. However, a few experts cautioned that there are drawbacks to the deterrence mission there, most notably that it makes U.

Some experts agreed that having U. The experts all agreed that U. Two experts said the American presence also has helped stabilize the "historically fraught relationship between Japan and South Korea," which included a decades-long colonization of Korea that only ended when Japan lost World War II.

However, the opposition to U. And having U. Follow him on Twitter StephenLosey. Volcanic activity beneath Iwo Jima, site of a defining World War II battle, is pushing sunken naval vessels to the surface.

A new hotline and a more comprehensive, comparative claims processing system are among the efforts to assist Gulf War and Two Russian Tu strategic bombers reportedly practiced bombing runs at the Ruzany firing range, about 37 miles east of the At least five service members allegedly were part of the deadly pro-Trump mob that assaulted the U.

Capitol on Jan. American servicemen will have less than 10 minutes between the time they become aware of a PLA attack and the moment their runways begin to be cratered by PLA munitions.

This is a frighteningly small amount of time to get dozens of planes up into the air. The U. To make matters worse, dispersing to airfields across Japan is not something USFJ airmen and naval aviators practice regularly today. The necessary solution is to begin dispersing American military assets now , well before any future conflict. American diplomats and defense officials should make it a priority to expand basing access across Japan.

It is unlikely that there will be any new bases stood up. What is possible is the granting of permission for U. Many Japanese air bases could—with necessary changes made for accommodating the extra troops—easily host American fighter, bomber, or airlift squadrons.

Joint basing would require some difficult organizational changes, streamlining U. But it can and should be done. But neither new joint basing nor U. With American basing at the center of every Okinawan election campaign, foreign-service officers and American military liaisons responsible for American basing already have very busy bandwidths.

Even outside of Okinawa, individual communities often resist standing up new bases or receiving a larger number of American troops on NIMBY grounds. To win over these communities, the economic benefits of hosting U. Municipalities with dwindling populations can be shown that an influx of young people with cash to spend is an economic windfall. The Diet of Japan could sweeten the deal by offering tax incentives or economic subsidies to municipalities willing host American troops, as they did in in in the face of local opposition to the transfer of carrier-borne fighters from Atsugi to Iwakuni.

This will cost the Japanese government money and political capital. Subsidizing the decentralization of U. By underwriting the construction of new facilities, the Japanese government would be paying more to support American servicemen in Japan, as Trump wishes. But they would also be getting more for their payment. After all, why should the Japanese pony up more funds for a military deterrent that can be destroyed in one crippling surprise attack?

On the other hand, why should the United States station its soldiers, sailors, and airmen in a country that is not willing to bear the financial and political costs of ensuring these men and women do not vainly die in the first few minutes of combat?

Tanner Greer is a writer and strategist based in Taiwan. Tokyo picked a trade brawl with Seoul—but wasn't prepared for the inevitable blowback.

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